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19.1  Work disability across European countries 
Disability insurance – the insurance against the loss of the ability to work – is a 
substantial part of social security expenditures and an important part of the welfare 
state regime in all developed countries (Aarts et al., 1996). Like almost all ele-
ments of modern social security systems, disability insurance faces a trade-off. On 
the one hand, disability insurance protects unhealthy people who are not able to 
work from falling into poverty before they are eligible for normal retirement bene-
fits. On the other hand, however, disability insurance creates incentives to exit the 
labour force early and may act as another pathway to early retirement without the 
incidence of a major health loss. 
The recipiency rates of disability insurance (DI) benefits vary strikingly across 
European countries, see Figure 19.1. They are defined as the share of all individu-
als aged 50 to 64 who receive benefits from DI. With 15.6% and 11.6% the Nordic 
countries  Sweden  and  Denmark  have  fairly  high  recipiency  rates.  The  Central 
European countries cover a broader range. The rate of the Netherlands is 14.0% 
and thus similar to the Nordic countries while in France only a 1.7% of the people 
receive DI benefits. In the Mediterranean countries lower rates can be observed 
varying from 3.3% in Greece to 9.0% in Spain. The Eastern European countries 
exhibit the highest recipiency rates. While the Czech Republic with 12.3% is in a 
range with Denmark or the Netherlands, the Polish rate of 19.2% exceeds the rest 
by far. 
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Source: SHARE wave 2 (2007), population weighted data 
 
Why are so many more individuals aged 50-64 receiving DI benefits in Denmark, 
Sweden and the Netherlands than in e.g. France or Germany? Why so many fewer 
individuals in Greece than in Poland? This chapter investigates the causes for this 
variation. Three candidate causes come to mind: cross-national differences in the 
age structure, cross-national differences in health, and cross-national differences 
in the early retirement incentives created by the DI system. In earlier work based 
on the 2004 waves of SHARE, ELSA and HRS, we showed that cross-sectional 
differences in demographic structure and current health status cannot explain the 
cross-national differences in DI recipiency (Börsch-Supan, 2005) although health 
explains  a  great  deal  of  the  within-country  variation  (see  also  Avendano  and 
Mackenbach in this volume). A second stage of our research was based on two 
waves of data. We showed that health events between waves did not significantly 
trigger a higher probability of becoming a DI benefit recipient (Börsch-Supan, 
2008). 
The poor explanatory power of a broad battery of health measures used in these 
studies,  including  objective  and  subjective  measures  as  well  as  performance 
measures of physical and mental health, is disturbing and undermines the role of 
DI as an insurance of last resort against failures of health in working age. It has 
been criticized, however, that current health measures, as broad as they may be 
measured, do not appropriately capture the full impact of poor health on employ-
ability. Rather, it is argued, work disability is the result of a long lasting process of 
becoming sick and finally unable to work.  
This  paper  therefore  takes  a  life-course  approach.  Thanks  to  the  new 
SHARELIFE dataset, we are able to add to the analysis a set of variables that ac-
count for those long-run effects. We first create lifetime health indicators that de-
scribe childhood and adulthood health status. In addition, we take other life-course 3 
features  into  account  such  as  childhood  socio-economic  status,  quality  of  the 
working place and marital status over the whole life course. 
In the following section, we will briefly describe our approach. We then pre-
sent our results at the individual level. We find that both current and life-course 
health significantly influences the probability of receiving DI benefits. We then 
turn to the cross-national level. We find that welfare state differences dominate at 
this level while cross-national health differences remain largely irrelevant even 
when taking life-course health measures into account. 
19.2  Variables and technique 
We focus our analysis on people at the age between 50 and 64 because this is the 
time span in which exiting the labour market via DI may be an attractive opportu-
nity for early retirement. Beginning with age 65, normal retirement benefits are 
available in all 13 countries in our analysis. The baseline of analysis is the year 
2007. We have a large number of 10,385 observations, on average 800 in each 
country,  with  substantial  differences  across  countries.  Our  dependent  dummy 
variable is the recipiency of DI benefits. Following the three candidate causes and 
distinguishing current status from life-time influences, we employ five categories 
of variables: 
1.  Current basic demographic characteristics: age, gender and years of edu-
cation. 
2.  A  broad  range  of  variables  describing  current  health:  self-perceived 
health, functional physical status described by the number of limitations 
in activities of daily living (ADL) and limitations of instrumental activi-
ties of daily living (IADL), mental health status as measured by EURO-
D, grip strength as indicator of physical performance. 
3.  Life course health indicators include childhood health status and adult-
hood health status. Childhood health is described by the number of ill-
nesses lived through until the age of 15. For adulthood health a similar 
measure is taken, and in addition a binary variable indicating if someone 
had suffered from an extended period of poor health. Moreover, we in-
clude the number of gaps in the working history in which a person was 
sick or disabled. 
4.  Life course control variables include childhood socio-economic status, 
work quality and marital status. The socio-economic status during child-
hood is measured by the number of books, rooms per person in the ac-
commodation and relative skills in mathematics at the age of ten. Work 
quality is measured as the subjective assessment of the physical and psy-
chological demands at work. We also account for the number of jobs dur-
ing lifetime. Finally, we include binary variables indicating if someone 
has been married, divorced or widowed during her or his lifetime. 4  
5.  Variables describing the generosity of the welfare system regarding DI 
and alternative pathways are taken initially from OECD (2003). We have 
updated and extended these indicators to the countries not covered by the 
OECD. In general the OECD gives scores from 0 to 5 whereat a higher 
score represents a more generous system. At DI coverage 5 points are 
given if the DI covers the whole population while 0 points represents 
coverage only for employees. The minimum disability level that is re-
quired to be eligible is measured as percentage measure of work disabil-
ity. The lower the percentage required the higher the score given. The 
maximum benefit level is measured as a replacement rate. A higher rate 
leads to a higher score. The strictness and whether DI benefit eligibility 
requires a medical assessment or whether a vocational assessment is suf-
ficient is also included in the analysis. Finally, we insert a measure for 
the strictness of the unemployment insurance as an alternative pathway of 
early retirement. 
Our  analysis  is  divided  into  two  parts.  First,  we  relate  at  the  individual  level 
whether a person receives DI benefits to the above set of explanatory variables. 
We do this by pooling the SHARELIFE data from all countries and performing 
probit, logit and linear regression analyses. We also assess how much total varia-
tion in DI benefit recipiency at the individual level is explained by the different 
categories of variables. 
Second, we analyze the cross-national variation depicted in Figure 19.1. To do 
so, we perform simulations which hold some of the explanatory variables counter-
factually constant. If this group of variables were the main cause for the interna-
tional variation, the simulated outcome should produce roughly identical percent-
ages of DI benefit recipiency in each country. 
19.3  Regression results at the individual level 
Since the dependent variable – receipt of DI benefits – is binary we begin with a 
probit and a logit specification. Only the probit results are shown below since they 
yield very similar results explaining about 23% of the total variation (measured as 
the pseudo R²) which is quite a satisfactory value at the individual level. We also 
used a linear specification because it delivers essentially the same regression re-
sults (although on a different scale) and permits a more straightforward way to de-
compose the total variance. 
All five categories of variables are jointly statistical significant: the correspond-
ing  F-test  values  are  23.4  for  demographic  variables,  208.6  for  current  health 
measure, 29.6 for the welfare state indicators, 201.9 for life-course health and 90.3 
for all other life-course variables. Table 19.1 presents the results for the probit and 
linear specification. For the probit model, marginal effects are shown rather than 
the regression coefficients. 5 
Age and years of education have a negative effect on the receipt of DI benefits. 
Hence, older individuals have a smaller probability of receiving DI benefits. This 
may sound counterintuitive since health declines as we age. However, we control 
for health, see below, and alternative retirement pathways become available at 
older ages. More educated individuals are less likely to receive DI benefits. Male 
individuals are more frequently DI benefit recipients than female. 
All current health measures have the expected sign and are significant, except 
for the number of ADL limitations. A dummy variable of the presence of ADL 
limitations, however, is significant. Better health leads to a lower probability of 
receiving DI benefits. As a remarkable result, we find that the more subjective a 
health measures is, the stronger is its influence. This may be an indication of some 
extent of self-justification (see Banks et al., 2004). 
The life-course health variables show a clear picture. All life course indicators 
describing long-term health show the expected direction. Moreover, these vari-
ables are highly significant jointly but also each for itself as it can be seen in the 
table above. This result is robust over all three specifications. The variable de-
scribing childhood health is not significant. 
 
Table 19.1:  Determinants of DI recipiency 
Variables  Probit  Linear 
   Marginal  
effects 
Standard  
error  Coefficients 
Standard  
error 
Age (years)  -0.001  (0.0006)  -0.001**  (0.0006) 
Gender (dummy)  -0.044***  (0.0070)  -0.056***  (0.0082) 
Education (years)  -0.002***  (0.0007)  -0.002**  (0.0007) 
Self-perceived Health (1-5)  0.038***  (0.0028)  0.039***  (0.0030) 
ADL (0-6)  0.002  (0.0050)  0.022  (0.0140) 
IADL (0-7)  0.025***  (0.0046)  0.067***  (0.0125) 
Maximal Grip Strength (kg)  -0.001***  (0.0003)  -0.001***  (0.0004) 
EURO-D (0-12)  0.004***  (0.0012)  0.005***  (0.0016) 
Childhood Illnesses (0-7)  -0.003  (0.0027)  -0.005  (0.0031) 
Adulthood Illnesses (0-5)  0.017***  (0.0026)  0.037***  (0.0058) 
Working Gaps due to Sickness (0-2)  0.052***  (0.0114)  0.118***  (0.0301) 
Period of very poor Health (dummy)  0.056***  (0.0051)  0.060***  (0.0061) 
Rooms per Person  -0.003  (0.0065)  -0.002  (0.0030) 
Number of Books (dummy)  -0.002  (0.0055)  -0.002  (0.0056) 
Mathematical Skills (dummy)  -0.007  (0.0052)  -0.005  (0.0050) 
Number of Jobs  -0.003***  (0.0013)  -0.005***  (0.0013) 6  
Physical Demand of Work (dummy)  0.022***  (0.0053)  0.024***  (0.0062) 
Psychological Demand of Work (dummy) -0.005  (0.0049)  -0.007  (0.0051) 
Married (dummy)  -0.013  (0.0089)  -0.019*  (0.0105) 
Divorced (dummy)  0.012*  (0.0063)  0.015**  (0.0072) 
Widowed (dummy)  0.005  (0.0094)  0.005  (0.0109) 
Coverage (0-5)  0.010***  (0.0030)  0.011***  (0.0036) 
Minimum Disability Level (0-5)  0.010***  (0.0027)  0.009***  (0.0025) 
Replacement Rate (0-5)  -0.007**  (0.0029)  -0.006**  (0.0027) 
Medical Assessment (0-5)  0.005*  (0.0025)  0.007***  (0.0028) 
Vocational Assessment (0-5)  -0.017***  (0.0028)  -0.017***  (0.0034) 
Unemployment Benefits (0-5)  0.013***  (0.0043)  0.014**  (0.0055) 
Constant        0.125**  (0.0599) 
***, **, *: Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.  
 
Among the other life-course variables, the only significant ones are the subjective 
physical demand of work, the number of jobs and the binary variable describing if 
someone has been already divorced. Higher physical demand of the work leads to 
a higher probability of receiving benefits while an increase in the number of jobs 
leads to a decline in the reception of DI benefits. Suffering from at least one di-
vorce increases the probability of being eligible. 
The OECD indicators describing the generosity of the welfare system regarding 
DI and alternative pathways vary only across countries.  They are nevertheless 
jointly significant and have, besides the replacement rate, the expected direction: 
the more generous the DI, the higher the probability of receiving the benefits. The 
broader the job range of vocational assessment, the less likely is the receipt of DI 
benefits. Strict eligibility rules and a low replacement rate of the unemployment 
insurance, a possible alternative pathway to retire early, increase the likelihood of 
receiving DI benefits. 
Figure 19.2 shows how much variation at the individual level is explained by 
each of the five groups of  variables, for simplicity  using the  linear regression 
model. The full linear model explains some 14.65% of the variation in the data. 
Basic demographic characteristics and education explain less than 1% of the indi-
vidual variation. The OECD indicators vary only across countries and therefore 
explain, by definition, very little at the individual level. Current health measures 
have the largest explanatory power with over 9% of the individual variation ex-
plained. Life-course health variables are almost as powerful and explain 7.2% of 
the individual variation, while the other life-course variables explain 6.5%. These 
results are in line with the findings by Avendano and Mackenbach in this volume. 
 















Based on the linear regression model.  
 
Quite clearly, both current and life-course health are highly predictive of receiving 
DI benefits at the individual level. Together, the health variables explain 12.4% of 
the total variation, i.e. 85% of the explained variation. Self-rated health is far the 
strongest single health variable, explaining 6.8% of the total variation. 
19.4  Counterfactual simulations at the country level 
This decomposition is dominated by intra-country individual variation and there-
fore does not shed much light on the large variation across countries. In order to 
separate cross-national from within-country variation, we predict DI recipiency 
rates at the country level with a counterfactual simulation which sets potential ex-
planatory variables at the same level (usually the sample average) for all individu-
als across all countries. If a group of variables were the main driver of cross-
national differences of DI recipiency, then equalizing these variables should also 
equalize the DI recipiency rates. 
We perform three sets of such counterfactual simulations. The first set repro-
duces  the  results  of  Börsch-Supan  (2005)  with  the  2007  data.  It  equalizes  the 
demographic structure (i.e., all individuals are counterfactually assigned the same 
age, gender and number of years in education) and health. Figure 19.3 shows the 
resulting counterfactual cross-national distribution of DI recipiency rates.  
The second bar for each country in Figure 19.3 equalizes age, gender and edu-
cation across countries. Quite clearly, the resulting counterfactual DI benefit re-
cipiency rates are virtually identical to the actual rates, represented by the left bar. 8  
Hence, age, gender, and education differences across countries can be ruled out as 
drivers of the cross-national variation in DI recipiency. 
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Simulation based on linear regression model. Brackets denote standard errors. 
 
The right bar equalizes all current health measures. In countries with a relatively 
low level of health (especially Poland) and in Switzerland, where health is particu-
larly high, we can indeed attribute some of the cross-national variation in DI bene-
fit recipiency to  health since the counterfactual prediction puts these countries 
closer to the average. The opposite, however, is true for those three countries in 
the EU15 in which benefit recipiency rates were particularly high in 2007: Swe-
den, Denmark, and the Netherlands. For these countries, correcting for health ex-
acerbates the cross-national differences rather than levelling them off. Moreover, 
e.g. in Germany, measurements of objective health turn out to be better than the 
European average, while self-rated health is reported to be lower than the Euro-
pean  average.  Equalizing  both  objectively  measured  and  self-rated  health  thus 
compensates each other. The opposite can be observed in Belgium. In summary, 
except for Poland, Greece and Switzerland, current health is not a main driver of 
cross-national variation in DI recipiency. This is a remarkable result as DI recipi-
ency should be linked to work disability and thus health. 
Current health, however, even if broadly measured, may be too narrow a health 
measure  to  determine  the  probability  of  receiving  DI  benefits  because  health 
events which took place much earlier in life may have driven the transition out of 
work. Possible influences are multi-dimensional. There may be direct effects of 
childhood diseases that have undermined resilience in old age and then lead to a 
disability. There may also be indirect effects of childhood diseases that worsen 9 
adult health at earlier stages. Often, disabilities are the result of long periods of ill-
ness and suffering from physical or mental impairments. Current health measures 
cannot reflect such long-term developments. Moreover, there may be other child-
hood living conditions such as socio-economic status that may build the back-
ground for later health problems and disability. 
We take account of these possibilities by performing a second set of counter-
factual simulations, now equalizing the life-course health and other life-course 
variables available in the SHARELIFE data, such as indicators for socio-economic 
status, marital history and work satisfaction. 
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Based on the linear regression model. Brackets denote standard errors. 
 
Figure 19.4 presents the results. They are unambiguous: life-course variables do 
not explain the cross-national variation. Not a single difference is statistically sig-
nificant. 
So  far,  we  have  ruled  out  demographics,  education,  current  and  life-course 
health and other life-course characteristics as causes for the cross-national differ-
ences in DI benefit recipiency. Among the variables discussed in the introduction, 
institutional  features  and  their  incentives  created  remain  as  another  potential 
cause. Our third set of counterfactual simulations therefore equalizes all variables 
that describe the generosity of the DI system and potential alternative pathways, 
such as unemployment insurance. 
Figure 19.5 shows that actual and simulated now diverge considerably. Except 
for Switzerland and Poland, the simulated recipiency rates of DI benefits are much 
more equal across countries when we assume the same institutional framework in 
every country. Most importantly and as opposed to Figure 19.3, those three coun-10  
tries in the EU15 in which benefit recipiency rates were particularly high in 2007 
– Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands – now exhibit much smaller DI rates 
when the generosity of their DI systems is reduced to the average level across the 
13 included countries. 
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Simulation based on linear regression model. Brackets denote standard errors. 
19.5  Discussion and conclusions 
In assessing our results, it is important to distinguish individual level variation 
from cross-national variation. Since we have more than 10,000 observations and 
only 13 countries, our regression results (Table 1) are dominated by the within-
country variation. Here, both current and life-course health variables are highly 
significant both jointly and each for itself at the individual level. This shows that 
these variables are reliable measures of health, and they indeed contribute to about 
85% of the overall explained variation across individuals. Variables describing the 
welfare state, however, especially the generosity of the DI system, cannot deter-
mine within a country if someone receives DI benefits because all individuals face 
the same DI system. 
In our counterfactual simulations (Figures 19.3, 19.4 and 19.5), we only see the 
cross-national variation. At this level, the roles of health and DI system generosity 
switch completely. Neither current nor life-course health can be identified as a 
source of cross-national variation in the DI recipiency rates, while variables de-
scribing the generosity of the DI system have strong explanatory power. This ex-11 
planatory power is driven by the large differences in DI generosity across coun-
tries as described by the OECD indicators. 
This leads to a threshold interpretation (Croda and Skinner, 2009): Our broad 
set of health variables rank individuals well by health within each country. The 
thresholds, however, beyond which DI benefits are granted, are country-specific 
and have almost no relation to health. They are products of institutional character-
istics such as minimum benefit levels and assessment requirements. 
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